Abstract: This article studies involuntary transfer of property rights by theft -a topic almost unexplored in the law and economics literature. The legal question is whether a buyer of a stolen good should be able to keep the good given good faith. Different jurisdictions treat this issue differently. In the US, a thief cannot give good title, whereas in Civil law, this is sometimes possible, if certain requirements are satisfied which are described in the article. The traditional law and economics approach suggests that there is a tradeoff between the costs from protecting the good against the costs of verifying the ownership. However, as shown in this article, the rule of law concerning this matter significantly affects parties' incentives differently. Based on a game theoretical model, it is shown that a rule of law, where good faith is irrelevant in determining the issue of property rights Pareto dominates a rule of law, where good faith may protect the interests of a buyer in good faith. Specifically, it is shown that an owner of an asset will spend more resources on protecting his property, and potential buyers will incur higher costs in order to verify the ownership when good faith is decisive for the transfer of property rights.
Introduction
Imagine a situation where a person purchases a good from a seller, but afterwards another person shows up demanding the good handed over claiming that the person is the rightful owner of an asset arguing that a thief had just stolen the good. The basic question is whether the buyer should be allowed to keep the good or not, assuming that the buyer was in good faith i.e. she did not know the good was actually stolen. Moreover, the problem deals with under which conditions the initial owner can contests the validity of the deal between the purchaser and the thief. The situation is identical to the case where the initial owner contracts with a buyer and afterwards resells the same good to another buyer, although this article focuses on the former case.
The term rei vindicatio stems from Roman law describing an owner's right to claim his good back from a person, who unlawfully has the good in his possession. Natural law or jus naturale was the dominant legal foundation for the majority of European countries which coincide with Roman law 1 .
The rule was an absolute doctrine of vindication which was regarded as an inherent attribute embedded in the notion of property rights at that time.
Different legal systems prescribe various solutions to this fundamental problem of property rights.
Some legal systems place the entire risk on the buyer, whereas other systems place the risk on the initial owner. However, as this article shows, the choice of legal rule has important economic consequences and thus influences parties incentives.
A person who is offered a television in the parking lot outside a bar is rarely in doubt that the television is stolen. In other situations, a person may find it difficult to determine the likelihood that the offered good is stolen. For instance, when used goods are offered for sale outside private homes (garage sales) or sold through pawn shops. In many cases, stolen goods are mostly traded in workplaces where many people interact and rarely in sinister places.
In some situations, a person may even place an order announcing his interest in a particular good, e.g. in a designer manufactured good or a rare cultural artifact.
As a matter of fact, the problem of who should be the rightful owner not only concentrates to small private transactions, but also to large international transactions involving government agencies and private organizations. For instance, famous accredited museums located in the western world arrange exhibitions of fine art of foreign cultural artifacts. In several cases, the original country seeks to get the cultural artifacts handed over claiming that they are stolen or transported illegally abroad claiming that the cultural artifacts belong to the national inheritance. Whether the museums are in good faith is difficult to assess for certain, but the choice of legal rule obviously raises some important cultural and financial aspects. For instance, should a country of origin receive some kind of compensation and or not, and if compensated, how does one determine a just compensation in the absence of a market for such goods. The problem is complicated by the fact that the appropriate choice of law needs to be solved first. Besides these legal aspects, there is considerable political pressure from powerful interest groups that may try to influence the public debate over this question.
Another possibility is for a thief to sell the stolen goods through an auction, particularly if the auction house does not require the ownership documented, which is the case at some auction houses on the Internet. The problem not only relates to the law of property rights, but in addition to criminal law, since almost all jurisdictions in the world have criminal liability for handling stolen goods. Therefore, one needs to take this fact explicitly into consideration, because a potential buyer not only cares about the risk of handing the good back to the original owner, but also the expected punishment by a criminal court.
Alternatively, instead of having a separate criminal article for handling stolen goods, the buyer might be charged with complicity participation. The reason for punishing a buyer who knows (or should have known) that the good is stolen is that legislature seeks to impede the distribution of stolen goods and thereby the aggregate number of thefts in the economy. The aim is to restrict such transactions to the black market where trade is more risky.
Furthermore, the choice of legal rule also affects people's incentives to protect their property´, e.g. through buying private security services (see Benson and Mast (2001) for a study of the effects of privately produced general deterrence). One would expect that in jurisdictions, where the law allows a buyer to keep an asset given a buyer's good faith, property owners' expenditures for protecting their property would increase. It is well-known that private expenditures on crime reduction may generate externalities (see e.g. Ayres and Levitt (1996) , although there is no guarantee that the mentioned rule coincides with the social optimal level of private security. On the other hand, a rule that places the risk on the buyer provides potential buyers with incentives to investigate and verify the ownership of a particular asset.
This article formulates a game theoretical model analyzing how a rule of law, which allow a buyer in good faith to keep the good, influences parties incentives compared to a regime where good faith does not protect the interests of a buyer. It is shown that incorporating good faith into the analysis significantly influences the incentives of an initial owner to protect his property as well as how much a potential buyer is willing to spend on verifying the ownership. It is shown that the aggregate number of theft is higher under a European rule of law, where good faith is allowed, compared to an American rule, where good faith is absent. More specifically, it is shown that an American rule of law Pareto dominates a European rule of law, since an owner under the former rule of law spends more resources protecting her property and thus provides a potential buyer with incentives to verifying the ownership. The article also describes how various European civil law jurisdictions often modify the principle of good faith in different ways.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section 2, a brief literature review is presented and in Section 3, I provide a short overview of different Civil Law jurisdictions concerning under what conditions a buyer is entitled to keep the good. In section 4, a formal game theoretical model is formulated, where the issue of good faith is incorporated explicitly. This is followed by a discussion in section 5. The article ends with a conclusion in section 6.
Literature
The law and economics literature on this interesting issue seems to be rather scarce. Cooter and Ulen, however, (2000) stand as an exception. Cooter and Ulen argue that one may distinguish between a so-called American rule and a European rule, where the former protects the buyer whereas the latter places the risk on the initial owner, as a buyer in good faith is entitled to keep the good.
They present an appealing and simple approach arguing that efficiency requires one to compare the lowest costs to the original owner of protecting against theft relative to the lowest cost to the purchaser of verifying whether a seller is indeed the rightful owner. If the costs of the former exceed the latter, it is more efficient for a good faith buyer to acquire good title against the original owner and vice versa. However, this straightforward approach ignores the strategic interaction between the parties involved, which is typically embedded in such a situation. To elaborate, a person who is offered a good for sale observing that an owner of property spends a considerable amount on protecting his property is less likely to anticipate that the good is stolen. In addition, there is no empirical evidence about these values leaving room for a deeper analysis of the situation.
Rule of law in selected Civil law jurisdictions
As mentioned, various legal systems solve this problem of property rights differently. Jurisdictions that protect the buyer emphasize the importance of promoting trade among independent parties, whereas jurisdictions which protect the initial owner regardless of good faith by the buyer care strictly about property rights in society. However, if one considers the law in several Continental
European countries, the classification offered by Cooter and Ulen (2000) seems somehow to be modified, as it is dubious whether one may talk about a European regime of law as such.
In German law, it is not possible to acquire property of a stolen good, even if a buyer is in good In French Law, the problem is considered as an excuse to void a contract due to fraud denoted "Dolus" (the other types are mistake and duress). The case will be considered as fraud under article 1116 of the Civil Code, since the thief deliberately hides the fact that the good is stolen when he contracts. French law (case law) makes a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental fraud, and in this case it is regarded as fundamental fraud, because the buyer would never enter into this contract, if he knew that the good was stolen. As a consequence, the contract is voided. But more importantly, the initial owner is entitled to keep the good despite good faith of the buyer. The only thing the buyer can do is to claim damages for any amount paid for the good and any additional losses from the thief.
In Spain, when the thief steals the good from a household and sells it to a merchant, the household is entitled to keep the good whereas when the thief steels the good from a merchant and sells it to another merchant or household, the buyer is entitled to keep the good given good faith.
In Swedish law, the situation is governed by law (c.f. Law No. 796 of 1986, Om godtrosförvärv av lösöre). In paragraph 4, I, it is stated that when someone has lost his property (including by theft) and the buyer is in good faith, the initial owner is entitled to receive the good in exchange for compensation to the buyer. Paragraph 4, 2 states that the initial owner is only entitled to claiming the good back within a period of three months from the time he knew or should have know that the buyer was in possession of the good.
In Danish law, the situation is determined by case law which gives the initial owner the property rights to the good regardless of a buyer's good faith. However only under very special circumstances, the buyer is entitled to keep the good, i.e. if all four conditions are satisfied. First, the good needs to be in the buyer's possession and second in the possession of the thief. Third, the buyer must not have been negligent about the fact that the good was stolen (simple negligence precludes the buyers rights). It is up to a buyer to prove he was in good faith for instance by demanding an original sales contract from the thief.
The fourth requirement can be in interpreted as "something supplementary", as it is not enough that the previous conditions are satisfied, something more is needed to extinguish the property rights of an initial owner. According to Danish case law, only when the goods are bought from merchants or when the initial owner stands by and does not act to pursue his rights (denoted as passivity), the buyer is able to keep the goods.
As this brief description of selected Civil law countries reveals, it is hard to speak about one single European rule of law rule. Instead of a whole palette of different legal solutions, each having its own requirements before a buyer can win good title of the good. A possible explanation of this divergence in the rule of law might be that the economic effects associated with the rule of law have not been the subject of much attention among law and economist scholars.
The Model
The model considers two risk neutral persons strategic interaction; an initial owner of a good and a potential buyer. In addition, Nature serves as a random device representing uncertainty in the model personified by a thief as well as the police. The sequence of actions is as follows.
1. An initial owner of a good spends an amount of c dollars to protect the good from being stolen where
] which is observable. The owner derives utility V, while the good is in her possession but only 0 if the good is stolen.
2. Nature determines with probability π that the good is stolen by a thief and with probability (1-π) it is not stolen, respectively. Thus, we have π(c) where the probability of the good is being stolen is increasing in c, but decreasing in its second argument respectively exhibiting a convex relationship. The probability distribution of π(c,) is common knowledge.
3. A potential buyer is sure to receive "a take it or leave it" offer to acquire a similar good for a price T outside the "normal" market for such goods. The potential purchaser does not know whether the good is stolen or not, nor the identity of the initial owner. Assume that the good is traded in a fully competitive market, where marginal costs of theft equals price T which for simplicity is normalized to 1 (T could in principle equal any positive number but this would not change the structure of the game).
4. The buyer may incur some effort e where { } H e e , 0 ∈ seeking to determine whether the good is stolen or not, which is verifiable for a court, e.g. by making an inquiry at various public agencies asking if such a good has recently been stolen. Assume that u >( T + e), otherwise no trade will occur in the first place. The idea is that he might alternatively want to save these costs and sustain in ignorance, if e = 0. Let Π(c,e) denote the potential buyers "posterior" probability or "updated beliefs" that the good is stolen given e, which is specified as follows: These probabilities reflect the idea that a buyer after incurring effort e may revise his initial beliefs that the good is stolen, so that the posterior beliefs that the good is stolen may either increase or decrease. If the buyer incurs effort e and the new updated beliefs result in an increased probability that the good is stolen compared to the initial beliefs then a buyer is said to be in bad faith i.e λπ(c) > π(c),, otherwise if the probability decreases i.e. π(c) > λπ(c) he is said to be in good faith. The buyer is also in bad faith, if he deliberately chooses to stay in ignorance i.e. when e = 0.
Furthermore, it is assumed that if a buyer accepts an offer to buy a good that might be stolen this will stimulate criminal activity, since it becomes easier to sell stolen goods, hence the market for stolen goods becomes more profitable. This will cause more people to enter the market, and as a consequence the probability of theft increases in the economy.
The probability of theft now also depends on a potential buyer's decision, i.e. d = {accept, reject} with the following specification:
, where
if an offer is rejected 5. Thereafter, the potential buyer either accepts or rejects the offer. Notice that the buyer may decide to buy, even if he is aware that the probability of the good being stolen has increased.
The buyer enjoys utility U, if he buys the good, otherwise his utility is 0 (equal to his reservation utility).
6. If a buyer accepts the thief's proposal, there is a probability determined by Nature -hence, a risk for the buyer that the police will arrive at his home claiming the good handed over to the initial owner, which is equal to αΠ(c,d), where α∈ [0, 1] . This probability captures the fact that the police does not capture all burglars, so with probability
, the police will not show up. In the former case, the buyer is subjected to a fine for fencing, which equals T. The price T paid to the thief is not recovered.
7. With the American rule, the good is given back to the initial owner irrespectively of any good faith and the purchaser's utility declines to 0, but at the same time restoring the initial owner's utility V. It is assumed that the initial owner can always document that she is the rightful owner.
In contrast, the good is only handed over to the initial owner under the European rule, if the buyer was in bad faith, and the case is solved by the police.
The model's sequence of events is as follows:
1.Owner spends 2. Prob. of theft 3. Offer to Buyer 4. Posterior Beliefs 5. Accept/reject 6. Police arrives c π(c,)
In the following, I will analyze how the rule of law influences both parties' incentives seeking to determine which rule of law is most efficient. In doing so, the model will make use of game theory, which is particularly suited to model strategic interdependency, see e.g. Baird, Gertner and Picker (1998) for an interesting and pioneering work on game theory and the law. In order to predict how the parties will react, the analysis relies on the notion of subgame perfection, which is the appropriate equilibrium concept given the formulated model. First, a regime under American law is studied followed by a model under European law recognizing that the payoffs differ. The game is solved by backward induction, i.e. starting from the terminal nodes finding the Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Notice that even though the subgame perfect equilibrium usually deals with games of perfect information, it can easily be extended to cover uncertainty or exogenous events, see e.g.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) as well as Fudenberg and Tirole (1998).

A regime with an American Rule
As mentioned, the buyer is not able to keep the good in his possession, even if he is in good faith under the so-called American rule. To solve the game, we consider the terminal node, where the buyer must decide whether to accept or reject the offer, given he had previously selected his effort choice. Notice that when the potential buyer must decide whether to accept or reject the contract, the effort level is regarded as sunk costs. Therefore, it should not enter into the potential buyer's terminal decision problem, since the effort level has already been carried out. In the case where the good is not stolen, depicted in the lower node, it is optimal to accept any proposal, since (1-π)(u-T) is strictly positive. In deciding whether to accept or reject an offer, when the good is stolen, i.e. in the upper node we must compare the following payoffs. The right hand side of equation (1) shows his expected payoff from accepting the proposal, given he has examined the good.
Given the assumption that the fine F equals T and T is normalized to 1, we can simplify to obtain the following expression. Let ∆ = (U -1) denote the difference in value in excess of the price.
Hence expression (1) can be simplified to:
If the left hand side is lager than the fraction on the right side, it is optimal for a buyer to accept an offer, since U > T = 1. Therefore, a potential buyer must balance his net utility from the good, i.e. delta with the probability that the case is solved by the police, and he must return the good.
Expression (2) shows that if alpha decreases delta decreases.
This means that if the risk that the police will arrive is reduced, the net utility from being in possession of the good may be lower in order to induce an acceptance. One the other hand, if there is a large risk for the buyer that the case will be solved, his net utility from being in possession of the good must be sufficiently high in order to induce him to accept the offer.
However, the relationship is not linear, which is showed in figure 2 , where the graph of equation (2) is depicted showing an almost exponential relationship, where the upper set above the graph corresponds to the acceptance region, whereas below the graph a potential buyer should reject an offer.
[ INSERT FIGURE 2] When equation (2) holds, it is optimal for a buyer to accept the proposal. The same was true, when the buyer did not examine the ownership, i.e. when e = 0. Now working backwards, it remains to be determined whether or not the buyer should examine the good, given condition (2) holds. Clearly, it is not rational for a buyer to examine the good, since the right hand side of equation (3) is strictly larger than the left side.
When determining the initial owner's level of precaution c, he knows that a potential buyer will always accept an offer, hence criminal activity in the economy is increased, and a buyer will never spend any effort to investigate the ownership of the good. In order to analyze what is optimal for an owner under an American rule of law, let us first calculate the owners expected utility. Denote the optimal level of precaution by c*, where:
Notice that from the envelope theorem, we can immediately see that the owner's utility is increasing in alpha, so if the probability that the police solves the case increases, so does the utility of the owner. Finding the first order condition yields:
This leads to the first proposition relating to a regime of law, where any good faith by a buyer is neglected in deciding, if the buyer can keep the good or must be return the good to the initial owner.
Proposition I: Provided that condition (2) is satisfied, a regime that does not consider any good faith of a buyer of a stolen good will induce a buyer to accept any offer. The buyer will avoid
spending resources to examine the ownership of the offered good.
A regime with a European Rule
In the previous analysis, no attention was paid to whether a buyer was in bad or good faith.
However, this no longer holds since under the European rule, it does in deed matter, if a buyer was said to be in good faith or not. The rule of law naturally affects the payoff structure of the game, and the game under a European rule is depicted in figure 3 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 3] Notice, how good faith of a buyer is incorporated in the game using conditional probabilities. The game is solved using backward induction starting from the terminal nodes again recognizing that any effort level to examine, if a good is stolen, is sunk. Consider the case when the buyer must compare the payoffs from accepting and rejecting an offer, given the good is not stolen. Since both
(1-λπ)(U-T) as well as (1-π)(U-T) are always strictly larger than zero, i.e. the reservation utility from rejecting the offer, the potential buyer will always accept an offer in this situation.
The next step is for a buyer to determine, if he should spend any effort to examine the ownership of the good. Recall that when the buyer examines the good, he will get a more precise estimate whether the good is stolen or not i.e. after incurring costs to verify the ownership, he will be more certain, if the good is stolen or not compared to his initial beliefs. Given that λπ < π, the expected utility, when seeking to verify the ownership, exceeds his utility when he stays in ignorance in this situation. Therefore, in the case where Nature selects the lower node, we know just as in the previous case that a buyer will always accept and thus spend resources to verify the ownership.
When Nature picks the upper node, the situation gets more complicated. The problem of the potential buyer is to decide whether or not to accept an offer. Let
h e r e λ < 1 denote the posterior beliefs, when a potential buyer is in good faith and
is the posterior beliefs when a potential buyer is in bad faith. Left hand side of equation (6) shows the expected utility, when an offer is accepted, and the right hand side equals his reservation utility (again e is regarded as sunk costs). Denote ∆ the difference in utility in excess of the price T.
By comparing (2) and (7), we are able to determine whether a person under an American rule of law is more likely to accept an offer than under a European rule of law. Since equation (2) It is easy to show that a person who did not verify the ownership is willing to accept as long as condition (2) holds, i.e. there is no difference between the two rules of law in this situation. Now, it must be determined whether a person under European law is willing to examine the ownership, given that he will accept an offer.
A buyer is indifferent between examining the ownership or not when the following equation holds.
Whether a buyer will examine the ownership, therefore depends on the costs of effort as well as the joint probability that the police solve the case and the updated beliefs that the good is stolen. If the costs of examining the good are high then the buyer's net utility of being in possession of the good must also be higher in order to induce him to examine the ownership. Notice also that´, if the joint probability of α and Π decreases, then the right side of (9) increases, hence the buyer must value the good more in order to induce him to purchase.
The relationship is represented in the following graph (this can also be illustrated by constructing various level curves for a given value of delta)
[INSERT FIGURE 4] Figure 4 shows that for a given joint probability of α and Π, a buyer would accept higher costs of examining the ownership, if he values the good more. It was previously shown that under an American rule of law, a person would never examine the ownership. However, this no longer holds, since depending on the variables in expression (9), there exists persons that would prefer to examine the good. To illustrate, if delta is 3 and e H is 2 and the joint probability is ½, then the right hand side equals 2, so in this case a buyer derives a higher utility when he examines the good.
Turning to the owner's decision problem at the initial node, he knows that there is a higher probability of theft under a European rule of law, as expression (2) is higher than expression (7), where a potential buyer is indifferent between accepting and rejecting. In other words, given all the other parameters, a potential buyer under European rule of law could accept a lower net utility of the good from buying than under the American rule of law. Hence, the probability of theft under a European rule of law is higher compared to the probability under American rule of law.
The difference between conditions (2) and (7) determines the increased probability of theft under a European rule of law. Let δ denote this increase in the probability of theft under a European rule of law.
The owner knows that under European law the probability of theft is higher than under American law, so the relevant probability of theft now becomes πδ compared to only π in the previous case.
Comparing expression (12) and (5), it is evident that the expression in (12) is negative, but more importantly it is less than expression (5). From the convexity assumption, this implies that an owner under European rule of law spends more resources protecting his property than under an American rule of law. This leads to proposition II. 
Discussion and conclusion
The model has shown that allowing a person to keep a stolen good, if he is said to be in good faith, significantly affects parties incentives. More importantly, an American rule of law Pareto dominates a European rule of law, as a potential buyer spends wasteful resources trying to verify the ownership and owners of goods incur higher costs in order to deter burglars from stealing their property. Not only is the aggregate number of thefts in the economy impacted by the rule of law, but the analysis has shown that explicitly incorporating the strategic interaction between economic agents reveals that we need to refine our understanding of how the two rules of law influences efficiency compared to the initial analysis formulated by Cooter and Ulen (2000) .
The policy implication is, therefore, that jurisdictions based on Civil law should be more careful in allowing a person in good faith to keep a stolen good. Ideally, one would suspect to find that in countries where a good faith plays a role, persons incur higher costs in order to protect their propriety from being stolen compared to countries, where good faith does not serve as an excuse for a buyer to keeping the good. However, the empirical findings may be difficult trace to out, not only because it is difficult to estimate the exact amount people spend on protecting their property, but also because criminal activity is influenced by several other variables, often latent variables. As a consequence, it might be the case that people, e.g. in the US, spend more money on protecting their property than in Europe, but that this simply is due to the fact that there are other parameters that result in a higher crime rate in the US.
However, if e.g. a civil law country should decide completely to neglect any good faith from a buyer of stolen goods, the model predicts that efficiency would increase.
Another interesting issue which this analysis does not deal with is how the illegal market for stolen goods impacts the legal "normal" market. To illustrate, consider coinage. Stamping of coins with the kings monograph has always been laid in the hands of very few selected loyal bodies. This was done to avoid that the coins were faked, e.g. by mixing cheaper metals in gold coins since faked coins would be damaging to the monetary trade and thereby the wealth of the nation. More specifically, faked coins or stolen goods in general may in some situations drive out goods, which are sold through the normal market. This might result in a partial or complete market breakdown for legal goods depending on the rule of law. It seems plausible that a rule of law that protects a buyer in good faith, is more likely to experience such market failures, e.g. Akerlofs (1970) pioneering work of the Lemons market where bad used cars drive out good used cars (known as Gresham's law).
Parties were assumed to be risk neutral in the analysis. Incorporating risk aversion into the analysis seems as a natural extension for future work in this area, in particular how the possibility of buying insurance changes the results. 
